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This study investigates the effects of client’s financial risk, time to bankrupt-
cy, and auditor’s cognitive style on issuing a Going Concern Opinion (GCO) 
for failing companies. Empirical tests are based on financial data from 328 
bankrupt firms and peer review data from 172 auditors. Cognitive style on an 
intuitive-analytic dimension is approximated by the degree of auditor’s com-
pliance with the ISA standards for analytic procedures in peer review. Empir-
ical findings support research hypotheses and show that seriousness of the fi-
nancial risk and time distance to bankruptcy are important determinants of 
GC judgment accuracy. They also show that the performance of the cognitive 
style of the auditor is related to the fit between the cognitive style and the 
characteristics of the GC situation. The results indicate that an auditor’s indi-
vidual characteristics, i.e. cognitive style, affect his/her decision making when 
issuing GCO. This study is the first approach that systematically investigates 
the relationship between financial risk, distance to bankruptcy, and cognitive 
style on GC judgment in an archival research. 
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1. Introduction 
The GCO on the financial statements of a firm is an important issue that attracts 
a lot of public attention. When considering the opinion, the auditor is faced by a 
difficult task. If the auditor gives a modified opinion, the financial situation of 
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the firm can further deteriorate either leading to self-fulfilling prophecy (bank-
ruptcy) or to a serious damage in the customer relationship and future client 
profitability. If the auditor, however, does not issue a GCO on the financial 
statements of a bankrupt firm, it leads to obvious increase of litigation risk. 
Therefore, GCO has been an object for keen academic research for the last dec-
ades [1] [2] [3]. Previous studies have shown that auditors focus on client cha-
racteristics and distress rather than auditor economic incentives or litigation risk 
when evaluating clients as a Going concern [4]. These studies generally suggest a 
set of specific client characteristics including violation of debt covenants, low 
Z-scores, disclosed plans to alleviate financial distress, life-cycle stage, size, and 
corporate governance factors. However, smaller body of previous research has 
paid attention to the auditor cognitive process preceding a GCO [2]. In this 
process auditor’s experience and knowledge (individual characteristics) can play 
an important role [5] [6]. 
Although there are plenty of studies on GCO, empirical evidence is frag-
mented and contradictory. Bonner [7] examined the relationship between audi-
tor cognitive processes and GC judgment and concluded that differences in 
complexity across GC decision-making tasks likely account for some of the dif-
ferences in the results of studies. In experimental research, task complexity is re-
lated to the number of processing steps, the number of information cues availa-
ble, the number of decision alternatives, and the correlation between informa-
tion cues [8]. The main argument of this study is that in archival research the 
GC task complexity is related to the following two dimensions: estimated finan-
cial risk of the client and the time distance between the annual closing of ac-
counts and the bankruptcy date. When the estimated financial risk of the client 
is not high and the time distance to bankruptcy is long, to assess GC correctly is 
a very difficult and complicated task. However, when the estimated risk is high 
and the time distance to bankruptcy is short, the main cues are negative and 
correlate with each other so that the number of relevant cues is reduced. In this 
simple situation, the number of decision alternatives is limited and the number 
of processing steps can be low. When the estimated financial risk is lower and 
the time distance to bankruptcy longer, the complexity of the task will increase. 
The performance of the auditors in issuing a GCO largely depends also on the 
cognitive style of the auditor [9]. However, in order to result in a high perfor-
mance in GCO there must be a fit between the characteristics of the task and the 
cognitive style of the author. Otherwise, there is a cognitive misfit, which im-
pairs the performance [9] [10]. The situation where the structured financial in-
formation is dominant, analytic auditors may reach the best results in issuing a 
GCO to a bankruptcy firm. However, if there is a lot of unstructured non-financial 
information, it can be expected that intuitive auditors perform better than ana-
lytic auditors do. In situation where auditors have only little structured financial 
information and little unstructured non-financial information, it is probable that 
both analytic and intuitive auditors perform equally well. In these situations, 
there can be other auditor characteristics, which explain the differences in the 
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accuracy of GC judgments. 
Therefore, the hypotheses of the study are associated with the complexity of 
the GC judgment situation (task) and its fit with the cognitive style of the audi-
tor. It is proposed that the characteristics of the client situation before bank-
ruptcy and the individual characteristics of the auditor in correct and incorrect 
classifications of bankrupt firms differ with respect to complexity. Thus, the ob-
jective of the study is to assess two sets of hypotheses on: 
1) The effect of the client situation and  
2) The cognitive style of the auditor on GC judgment accuracy using a sample 
of Finnish bankrupt firms. 
In this study, it will be shown that empirical evidence supports these hypo-
theses, which implies that contradictory results in previous archival studies can 
at least partly be resulted from the differences in the complexity of bankrupt sit-
uation and the cognitive straits of the auditors in the sample. It also implies that 
when assessing GC auditors should be very careful especially in cases where the 
estimated financial risk of the client is not high and the threat of bankruptcy is 
not immediate. In these cases, the rate of misclassification is very high so that 
only a minority of bankrupt clients usually has got a GCO.  
This study is the first approach that systematically investigates the relationship 
between financial risk, distance to bankruptcy, and cognitive style on GC judg-
ment in an archival research. It contributes to the research on auditing and fail-
ure prediction when showing that an auditor’s accuracy in issuing a GCO largely 
depends on three factors: estimated financial risk of the client, time to bank-
ruptcy, and her or his cognitive style in decision-making. The content of this 
study is as follows. In this introductory section, the background and the objec-
tive of the study are presented. In the second section, the hypotheses are derived 
from prior research while the third section presents the empirical data and me-
thods. The fourth section presents the empirical findings and the last section 
summarizes the study.  
2. Prior Studies and Hypotheses 
The GC evaluation made by an auditor is based on knowledge obtained from 
audit procedures, and knowledge of conditions and events existing at or prior to 
the completion of fieldwork, that is related to the validity of the GC assumption 
and the use of the GC basis for preparing the financial statements [3]. The audi-
tor is also required to obtain information about managerial plans to mitigate any 
concerns and assess the likelihood of successful implementation of these plans. 
However, if the auditor still has substantial doubt about the ability of the client 
to continue as GC, he or she should consider the adequacy of disclosures in fi-
nancial statements. Furthermore, the auditor must modify his or her opinion to 
include an explanatory paragraph outlining the reasons for concern. The factors 
that affect the GC evaluation can be classified as client factors, auditor factors, 
auditor-client relationship factors, and environmental factors. In this review, a 
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limited set of client and auditor factors are considered to focus on the relevant 
area. Similarly, hypotheses are analytically drawn for a simplified GCO process 
of a failing (bankrupt) client.  
Client characteristics  
There are a variety of client characteristics associated with the issuance of 
GCO. Firstly, the most important client factor is financial statement information 
that includes financial ratios, such as profitability, leverage, and liquidity prior to 
GCO. Prior archival studies have generally found that auditors are more likely to 
issue a GCO when the client are less profitable [11] [12], have higher leverage 
[13] [14], have lower liquidity [11] [12], and are smaller [15]. In a survey re-
search, LaSalle & Anandarajan [16] showed that the top financial ratios used by 
auditors in practice are the following: 1) net worth/total liabilities, 2) cash flows 
from operations/total liabilities, 3) current assets/current liabilities, 4) total lia-
bilities/total assets, and 5) change in net worth/total liabilities. However, audi-
tors generally use also multivariate bankruptcy prediction models, such as Alt-
man Z-score, to improve ability to identify a financially distressed client [17] 
[18] [19].  
Secondly, non-financial client information that includes market variables, 
strategic initiatives, and governance characteristics is also important. When pre-
dicting GC reporting, Behn, Kaplan & Krumwiede [20] analyzed voluntarily dis-
closed managerial plans to alleviate financial distress (increase ownership equity, 
borrow money, restructure debt, and reduce spending or dispose of assets). They 
showed that auditors are less likely to issue GCO when management disclosed 
plans to issue equity or to borrow additional funds. Riley, Behn & Pany [21] 
found that management plans can provide GC resolution information to the 
market as to whether a client will likely resolve the GC problem. In addition, au-
ditors can rely on their own intimate knowledge of the client, client industry, 
and client management characteristics when forecasting client distress and se-
ceding whether to issue GCO [22]. However, Arnold, Collier, Leech & Sutton 
[23] concluded that auditors should be cautious when considering such 
non-financial information, because more experienced specialists can be better 
able to identify distressed clients.  
Auditor characteristics 
Evidence shows that as an auditor’s expertise in an industry grows, so does the 
ability to interpret the financial distress of a client embedded in that industry. 
More experienced auditors are able to make better GC judgments when being 
able to identify a typical audit event and to have a larger extent of knowledge ab-
stractness [24]. Similarly, auditors with better industry expertise are more likely 
to issue a GCO [25]. In general, GC decisions can be influenced by experience 
[26] and by prior involvement and beliefs, even where the information is redun-
dant [27]. The ability of an auditor to identify distressed clients on the basis of 
non-financial information is also related to experience [23]. However, evidence 
on the effect of audit fees (economic dependence of an auditor) and auditor size 
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on the propensity to issue a GCO is mixed [3]. Evidence however shows that au-
ditors in unlimited liability partnerships are more likely to issue modified audit 
opinions than are auditors in limited liability corporations (organizational form 
effect), maybe due to lower auditor reporting conservatism [28].  
There are two important effects in GC decision making that have an impact 
on the cognitive process of an auditor. Firstly, the order in which auditors re-
ceive evidence may influence GC judgments thus leading to a recency effect bias 
[29] [30] [31]. Due to this bias the auditor considers more recent information 
more important although there are not found any differences in importance. 
However, a simple decision aid to prompt auditors to consider the chronological 
order of evidence can eliminate recency effects in GC judgments [31]. Secondly, 
there is a bias to consider negative evidence more important than positive evi-
dence. Thus, auditors attend more to negative information about the client than 
to positive information in GC settings [16]. This bias may be related to that au-
ditors are potentially risk-averse when deciding whether to issue a GCO because 
of potential litigation concerns involved with issuing a clean opinion for clients 
that fail [2].  
Hypotheses on failing firms 
Previous studies indicate that the founding basis of GC judgment is got from 
the financial statement analysis of the client often based on a use of a prediction 
model. Typically, this prediction model is multivariate such as Z-score giving an 
estimate of the bankruptcy risk of the client. This kind of model helps the audi-
tor to expand his or her ability to identify a financially distressed client. Howev-
er, the auditor also makes use of plenty of non-financial information, such as 
managerial plans and reorganization actions, which are associated with avoiding 
the potential bankruptcy process that is going on. For a failing firm, this kind of 
information starts to flow immediately after the beginning of the failure (bank-
ruptcy) process. There is a wide variety in the length of the failure process, typi-
cally from a couple of months (acute failure) to several years (chronic failure) 
[32]. In time, this process can take several alternative temporal forms such as do 
suddenly, gradually, or lingeringly failing firms [33]. This form affects the tem-
poral accumulation (amount and timing) of non-financial information in dif-
ferent periods prior to bankruptcy. This kind of non-financial information is 
flowing until the bankruptcy date modifying continuously the estimate of the 
bankruptcy risk. However, the estimate given by the multivariate financial model 
is only based on the last financial statements and stays unchanged from the date 
of issue to the date of bankruptcy.  
Figure 1 shows how the estimate of bankruptcy probability made by an audi-
tor in GCO process develops until the failure (bankruptcy) date. The basis of the 
probability estimate is got from the financial prediction model calculated from 
the data received by the auditor at the date of preparing financial statements, TF 
days before bankruptcy. This probability estimate P(FB) is constant from TF to 
the time of bankruptcy 0. Thus, TF stands for the time distance between the  
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Figure 1. Development of the estimate of bankruptcy probability until the bankruptcy 
date. Legend: P(FB) = Estimate of the bankruptcy probability based on last financial 
statements; P(B) = Integrated estimate of the bankruptcy probability; TD = Time distance 
from issuing the audit report to the bankruptcy date; TF = Time distance from issuing last 
financial statements to the bankruptcy date.  
 
preparation date and the time of bankruptcy. Similarly, TD stands for the time 
distance between the date of issuing the audit report and the time of bankruptcy. 
However, non-financial information of financial distress has begun to flow from 
the beginning of the failure process T days before bankruptcy increasing the in-
tegrated bankruptcy probability estimate P(B) continuously. This probability es-
timate P(B) is based on both financial and non-financial information. At the 
time of bankruptcy 0, P(B) equals unity, since there is no uncertainty of the 
bankruptcy event. If it is assumed that the flow of non-financial information li-
nearly increases P(B) beginning from T to 0, then P(B) at time TD can be pre-
sented as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )





P FB T T
P B P FB
T
TP FB P FB
T
P FB P NFB
− −
= +
 = + − − 
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                (1) 
In this equation, the former term P(FB) shows the impact of financial (state-
ment) information on the estimate of bankruptcy probability at time TD while 
the latter term P(NFB) presents the impact of non-financial information.  
Let us assume that the estimate of the bankruptcy probability approximates 
the likelihood of the auditor to issue a GCO on the failing firm. The impact of 
financial information and the time distance to bankruptcy make the following 








                           (2a) 
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                       (2b) 
Thus, the effect of P(FB) on the likelihood to issue a GCO is positive and 
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stronger, the longer is the time distance to bankruptcy TD in relation to T (length 
of failure process). Similarly, the effect of TD on the likelihood is more negative, 
the lower is P(FB).  
The simplified model also allows us to calculate the ratio of the impact of 
P(NFB) to the impact of P(FB) in the following way: 
( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 D
P NFB T IR
P FB P FB T
   = − − =      
               (3) 
This equation thus describes the ratio of the non-financial information impact 
to the financial information impact. Since non-financial information is vaguer, 
more difficult to interpret, often contradictory, and sometimes weak, its inter-
pretation is a challenging task for an auditor. Therefore, the ratio can be entitled 
here as inaccuracy ratio IR such that the higher IR, the higher is inaccuracy as-
sociated with GCO issuing.  
The marginal effects of P(FB) and TD on IR can be presented as follows: 
( ) ( )2
1 1 DTIR
P FB TP FB
 ∂ −  = −   ∂    





T T P FB
 ∂ −
= − 
∂   
                      (4b) 
These results show firstly that the effect of P(FB) on IR is more negative, the 
lower is P(FB) and the longer is TD. Secondly, the effect of TD on IR is more neg-
ative, the shorter is T and the lower is P(FB). 
It is important to note that the time difference TF − TD is of importance. In 
this time period from the date of preparing financial statements to the date of 
issuing the audit report, P(FB) stays constant but P(B) will anyway increase due 
to the flow of additional non-financial information. The longer the time differ-
ence is, the higher is the effect of non-financial information and thus IR. Since 
the additional non-financial information is more recent than financial informa-
tion, the recency effect makes to the auditor the non-financial information more 
valuable than its real value. Because the additional non-financial information 
mainly includes negative messages from the failing process, the auditor further 
gives more additional value to this type of information. Therefore, the impor-
tance of non-financial information in GC judgment can be biased upwards. 
However, for failing firms it only increases the accuracy of estimate. For 
non-failing firms, it increases the likelihood of the Type II classification error 
when leading to misclassify some of them as failing firms. 
Thus, the simplified description of the GC process shows that the approx-
imated likelihood to issue a GCO on a failing firm is higher, the higher is the 
probability estimate given by the financial prediction model P(FB) and the 
shorter is the time distance to bankruptcy TD. The accuracy of the identifying a 
bankrupt firm is low, if P(FB) is low and TD is long. In this situation, it can be 
difficult to make a correct GC judgment, although P(B) may be upwards biased 
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due to the recency effect and the negative-signals effect. Anyway, these biases 
may lead to an increased probability of Type II error. It is also important to no-
tice that also P(FB) may be inaccurate itself giving too low failure probability es-
timates for bankrupt firms. In general, the classification accuracy of bankruptcy 
prediction models using traditional methods (available to average auditors) is 
about 80-90% for a period of one year [1]. In addition, the time distance from TF 
(date of financial statement preparation) to 0 may weaken the accuracy. For a 
longer time distance (365 or more days), leverage (solidity) ratios are best pre-
dictors of bankruptcy, whereas for a shorter distance (such as less than 183 
days), liquidity ratios play the dominant role [34]. Therefore, the choice of the 
financial prediction model should be related to the estimated stage of failure.  
The analysis above gives rise for four different hypotheses H1a-H1d presented 
in Figure 2. The hypotheses are as follows: 
H1a: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is high and the time distance to failure (TD) is long, the resulted accuracy 
of a GCO on failing firms is moderate. 
H1b: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is high and the time distance to failure (TD) is short, the resulted accu-
racy of a GCO on failing firms is high. 
H1c: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is not high and the time distance to failure (TD) is long, the resulted ac-
curacy of a GCO on failing firms is very low. 
H1d: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is not high and the time distance to failure (TD) is short, the resulted ac-
curacy of a GCO on failing firms is low. 
Thus, it is expected that the two main dimensions, P(FB) and TD, mainly de-
termine the accuracy of the GCO issued to failing firms (referring to Type I clas-
sification error).  
If the clients are classified into four classes according to hypotheses H1a-H1d, 
it is expected that there are auditor variables which within the classes explain the 
accuracy of GC decision making along P(FB) and TD. The decision to issue a 
GCO requires considerable auditor judgment ([3], p. 360). This judgment is 
largely based on the cognitive characteristics of the auditor, which can be classi-
fied into three types of variables: abilities, cognitive style, and strategy [9] [35]. 
In this classification, cognitive style entails distinctive ways of acquiring, storing,  
 
 
Figure 2. Four different situations to issue a GCO for failing firms (Type I error rate). 
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retrieving, and transforming information. The cognitive style can consist of two 
bipolar dimensions, perception and judgment ([9], p. 133). Perception is anc-
hored by sensation and intuition, represents the way in which the auditor perce-
ives incoming information. Sensors prefer facts while intuitives prefer possibili-
ties. Judgment is anchored by thinking and feeling representing the method to 
arrive at a decision. Thinkers rely on rational processes of association whereas 
feelers use relational comparisons [9] [36].  
Thus, dimensions perception and judgment make it possible to define four 
different cognitive styles for an auditor. There are two basic cognitive styles 
when the similar characteristics are combined. If the auditor at the same time 
prefers sensation and thinking, he/she can be regarded as an analytic individual 
by cognitive style. If the auditor simultaneously prefers intuition and feeling, 
he/she is an intuitive individual. However, if the cognitive style combines dis-
tinctive characteristic of the dimensions (sensation & feeling; intuition & think-
ing), the style is hybrid [9]. This kind of hybrid style can be regarded as a cogni-
tive misfit that may impair the performance of the auditor [9] [10]. If an auditor 
is analytic, he/she prefers structural problems and routine precise work whereas 
an intuitive auditor prefers new and unstructured problems and often makes in-
sightful decisions. If an analytic auditor is facing by new or unstructured prob-
lems or an intuitive auditor is facing by structural problems, there is a cognitive 
misfit and the resulted judgments may not be efficient. 
The cognitive styles can be integrated in the present framework. Figure 3 
presents hypotheses H2a-H2d which are drawn by combining the styles and the 
four GC judgment situations defined on the basis of P(FB) and TD. The situations  
 
 
Figure 3. Four different information conditions to issue a GCO for failing firms. 
E. K. Laitinen, T. Laitinen 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2020.101009 140 Theoretical Economics Letters  
 
strongly vary with respect to the nature and the amount of information acquired 
by the auditor in judgment. Firstly, when P(FB) is high and TD is long, there are 
a lot of negative financial information but only little non-financial information 
that has accumulated thus far. Financial information is based on facts making it 
possible to use a structured and precise procedure in GC judgment. However, 
non-financial information is typically vague and unstructured. This kind of situ-
ation is desirable for an analytic auditor who then can beat intuitive auditors in 
predicting accuracy. Secondly, when P(FB) is high and TD short, the present 
framework suggests that there is accumulated a lot of unstructured non-financial 
information along the structured financial information, which makes the situa-
tion desirable for an intuitive auditor. Thirdly, when P(FB) is low and TD long, 
the situation is opposite: there is little negative financial evidence on potential 
bankruptcy but, at the same, only little accumulated non-financial information. 
This kind of situation is desirable to neither an analytical auditor nor an intui-
tive auditor and represents thus a misfit. It is obvious that the GCO accuracy is 
low for both cognitive types due to poor information condition and misfit.  
Fourthly, when P(FB) is low and TD short, there is little financial evidence. 
Since P(FB) does not refer to a serious financial distress, also non-financial sig-
nals may be rather weak. The firms that behave in this way can be compared 
with the acute bankruptcy firms [32] or the suddenly failing firms [33]. In this 
kind of situation, auditors may perform better than in the previous situation but 
the information condition is not desirable for either of the cognitive types. In 
summary, the following hypotheses can be drawn: 
H2a: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is high and the time distance to failure (TD) is long, analytical auditors 
are more likely than intuitive auditors to issue GCOs to bankruptcy firms. 
H2b: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is high and the time distance to failure (TD) is short, intuitive auditors 
are more likely than analytical auditors to issue GCOs to bankruptcy firms. 
H2c: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is not high and the time distance to failure (TD) is long, analytical and 
intuitive auditors are equally likely to issue GCOs to bankruptcy firms (misfit of 
cognitive style). 
H2d: When the failure probability estimate given by the financial model 
(P(FB)) is not high and the time distance to failure (TD) is short, analytical and 
intuitive auditors are equally likely to issue GCOs to bankruptcy firms (misfit of 
cognitive style). 
Thus, it is expected that besides the main dimensions P(FB) and TD which 
mainly determine the GC judgment situation, the fit of the cognitive style with 
the information condition impacts the accuracy of the GCO issued to bankrupt-
cy firms (referring to Type I classification error). In such situations where P(FB) 
is low, cognitive style is not expected to affect the accuracy due to misfit (H2c & 
H2d). However, in those situations, other auditor characteristics like economic 
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dependence on the client, auditor size, industry specialization, and compensa-
tion arrangements may play a role.  
3. Empirical Data and Methods 
Firstly, the purpose of the empirical part is to assess the four hypotheses 
H1a-H1d summarized in Figure 2. These hypotheses assume that differences in 
the estimated bankruptcy probability given by the financial prediction model 
P(FB) and the time distance from the date of issuing the audit report to the 
bankruptcy date TD lead to differences in the GCO accuracy for failing firms. 
The empirical data, which are here used to test the hypotheses, include the last 
financial statements of 328 Finnish small and middle-sized firms (SMEs) bank-
rupted after 2010. These firms form a representative sample of Finnish bankrupt 
firms with respect to the size and industry. The data of the study are extracted 
from the Orbis database of Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) under a restriction that the 
selected firm must have an access to necessary audit variables used to test the 
hypotheses (see below). All these firms are limited companies. 
In the last financial statements before bankruptcy the average net sales of the 
sample firms was 1197.23 Teur whereas the median was only 478.00 Teur. In 
these statements, the average total assets were only 468.37 Teur the median be-
ing 175.50 Teur. The majority of bankruptcy firms are very small. However, the 
largest firm reported the last net sales as 44,576.40 Teur. Thus, the size distribu-
tion is skewed as it is in the population of Finnish SMEs. The sample includes 
firms from several industries such as manufacturing, trade, construction, and 
transportation. The industry distribution of the sample firms is comparable with 
the population of Finnish bankruptcy firms. However, finance and insurance 
companies are excluded from the sample due to their special nature of auditing 
in Finland.  
In Finland, a corporation is generally obliged to appoint an auditor and carry 
out audits in accordance with the Auditing Act. However, very small firms are 
not obliged to appoint an auditor if the size of the firm is below a certain thre-
shold. In the present sample, all firms have appointed an auditor and carried out 
audits in accordance to the act, and their size structure statistically represent 
typical Finnish SMEs. The present sample does not include larger public firms, 
which have special requirements for auditing. Thus, the findings of the study are 
drawn for failing Finnish industrial small and middle-size limited companies. 
These kinds of failing firms may have special characteristics that make them dif-
ferent from large firms [37].  
For this sample, TD and P(FB) were calculated to allow classify the bankruptcy 
firms into the four classes as described in Figure 2. First, TD was calculated 
simply as the number of days from the day issuing the audit report to the day of 
bankruptcy. The median value of TD in the present sample was 215.5 days that 
makes more than seven months. Secondly, the estimate of P(FB) was measured 
by the logistic bankruptcy prediction model estimated by Laitinen and Laitinen 
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([38], p. 174) using Finnish data from small and middle-size firms (SMEs). The 
coefficients of this model are estimated by the logistic regression analysis (LRA) 
based on the data from about 60,000 non-bankrupt SMEs and about 500 bank-
rupt SMEs approximately for one year prior to bankruptcy. This model is suita-
ble for using to estimate P(FB), since the firms in these data are similar to the 
firms in the present sample. The logit (L) of the model is calculated as follows: 
0.843 0.027 0.039 0.01L ER QR CF= − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅  
where: 
ER = the equity ratio (%) 
QR = the quick ratio 
CF = the traditional cash flow/net sales (%) 
This logit is used to calculate the conditional probability of bankruptcy as 
P(FB) = 1/(1 + e−L). The estimation was carried out as weighted to give equal 
weights for non-bankrupt and bankrupt firms. Therefore, the critical cut-off 
value of P(FB) is 0.5. For this cut-off value, the classification accuracy of the pre-
diction model even for very small firms was excellent ([38], p. 174). In the test 
data, the rate of correct classification for small bankrupt firms was 82.6% one 
year prior to bankruptcy. The median value of P(FB) in the present sample of 
328 bankruptcy firms was 0.82 that clearly exceeds the cut-off value.  
Secondly, the purpose is to assess empirically the hypotheses H2a-H2d using a 
set of auditor variables. In the 328 sample firms, 172 auditors were auditing the 
last financial year. Thus, the average number of bankruptcy firms per auditor is 
less than two (1.9). However, as many as 92 of 172 auditors (53.5%) had acted as 
an auditor only in one bankrupt firm. The low average number of bankruptcies 
per auditors is in line with the general frequency of bankruptcies in Finland, 
yearly 1% - 2% of firms (Statistics Finland: Bankruptcy Statistics). Panel 1 of 
Appendix 1 presents the eighteen auditor variables used in the study. Most va-
riables are collected from the Finnish Chamber of Commerce (FCC) material 
consisted of quality assurance reviews for the auditors of the bankruptcy firms. 
However, the salary information from the review year is received from Ve-
ropörssi (a company selling taxation information). The data received from FCC 
do not include audit firms auditing public interest entities, which excludes for 
example all Big 4 firms from the data. The data however include auditors from a 
number of smaller audit firms in addition to (individual) private auditors. The 
variables in the data include the final result of a peer review given on a 
four-grade scale 1 - 4 where 1 stands for failing the peer review and 4 for no de-
ficiencies in audit work.  
Furthermore, the data include measures for the level of compliance (%) with 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) assessed for four audit areas (Plan-
ning, Analytic procedure 1, Analytic procedure 2, and Conclusion) in peer re-
view. ISA 570 (Going concern assessment) is included in the part Analysis 2. 
This means that in peer review audit quality evaluation peer reviewer is moni-
toring if peer reviewed auditor has complied with ISAs. If an auditor has not 
E. K. Laitinen, T. Laitinen 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2020.101009 143 Theoretical Economics Letters 
 
complied with ISA standards in his/her engagements, it will lead to low quality 
in audit quality measure. In this review, detailed questions in the peer review are 
used to determine the level of compliance of ISA. Hypotheses H2a-H2d are as-
sociated with the effects of the cognitive style on the GCO accuracy. Therefore, 
the bipolar intuitive-analytic dimension is measured here by the degree of com-
pliance with the ISA standards in auditors’ use of analytic procedures in peer re-
view. The higher the compliance with the analytic standards, the higher is the 
analytic strait of the auditor. These measures vary from 0 to 100% so that the 
average values in the sample are 69.1% (part 1) and 73.2% (part 2). These meas-
ures for the intuitive-analytic dimension have a low negative correlation with 
experience (−0.15 & −0.00), a low positive correlation with the tier of the auditor 
(0.02 & 0.09), but a very high positive correlation with the final grade of the re-
view (0.68 & 0.65). 
It should be noted that The Finnish Auditing Act does not include the clear 
concept of Going Concern opinion. However, 15§ obliges auditors to disclose all 
the necessary information in the audit opinion. Furthermore, the associations of 
KHT (first tier) and HTM (second tier) auditors in Finland recommend that all 
auditors in Finland ought to comply with ISAs and thus also ISA 570. Hence, 
practically auditors should report if the ability of the entity to continue as a 
Going concern is compromised. The opinions that have a statement (modifica-
tion) about negative equity and reorganization in GCOs were added to ones that 
have a precise statement about the ability of the firm to continue as a Going 
concern. Thus, slightly over half of the opinions (54.6%) are GC modified, which 
is in line with previous studies from other countries. Carson, Fargher, Geiger, 
Lennox, Raghunandan & Willekens ([3], p. 357) show statistics that U.S. opi-
nions modified for GC uncertainties 2000-2010 on bankrupt firms have been on 
average 60.1%. However, the range of the percentage annually varied from 40.0% 
(2000) to 81.5% (2009).  
The hypotheses of the study are tested using simple statistical methods. 
Firstly, hypotheses H1a-H1d were assessed classifying the bankrupt sample firms 
into four groups according to whether or not they exceed the median values of 
P(FB) (0.82) and TD (215.5). Then, conforming to the order of hypotheses 
H1a-H1d the four groups of firms were organized as follows:  
a) high P(FB) & long TD,  
b) high P(FB) & short TD,  
c) not high P(FB) & long TD, and  
d) not high P(FB) & short TD.  
Appendix 1 presents the median values of a set of traditional financial ratios 
in these four groups to describe the financial situation of the client firms. These 
financial ratios are reported from Voitto+ database of Suomen Asiakastieto Oy 
(https://www.asiakastieto.fi/voitto/ohje/tunnusluvut_eng.htm#gearing). The set 
of ratios also includes ER, QR, and CF used in the logistic model. 
Then, the percentage of the firms receiving a GCO (accuracy of GCOs) was 
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calculated for each of the four groups. Finally, the differences in the percentages 
between the groups were tested statistically pairwise by the pairwise test of pro-
portions. Secondly, hypotheses H2a-H2d on the effect of the cognitive style of 
the auditor were statistically tested by the 1-tailed Chi-Square median test on the 
differences in the compliance measures (analysis 1 and analysis 2 parts) between 
the firms received a GCO and the firms not received a GCO. Since the distribu-
tions of the variables did not conform to the normal distribution in the groups of 
firms, a nonparametric statistical test was used. In the same way, the statistical 
significance of the differences in the auditor control variables between the classes 
of GCO was assessed. The description of these control variables is presented in 
Appendix 2. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Hypotheses H1a-H1d 
Panel 1 of Table 1 presents the percentage of the bankrupt sample firms received  
 
Table 1. The percentage of the bankrupt firms received a going-concern audit opinion 
(GCO) by groups. (a) Panel 1. Percentages by groups; (b) Panel 2. Groupwise comparison 
of percentages for firms with GCO. 
(a) 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
 
High P(FB) & 
Long TD 
High P(FB) & 
Short TD 
Not high P(FB) & 
Long TD 
Not high P(FB) & 
Short TD 
Firms received GCO: 
    
Median of P(FB) 0.9500 0.9500 0.7000 0.7200 
Median of TD 304.59 121.82 307.17 115.27 
Number of firms 49 77 23 30 
Percentage of firms 0.7101 0.8105 0.2421 0.4348 
Firms received not GCO: 
    
Median of P(FB) 0.9500 0.9500 0.5500 0.6100 
Median of TD 293.50 137.78 345.63 122.87 
Number of firms 20 18 72 39 
Percentage of firms 0.2899 0.1895 0.7579 0.5652 
(b) 
 
Z test statistic p-value 
Group 1 & Group 2 −11.2690 0.0000 
Group 1 & Group 3 37.9795 0.0000 
Group 1 & Group 4 19.4076 0.0000 
Group 2 & Group 3 54.1500 0.0000 
Group 2 & Group 4 33.1146 0.0000 
Group 3 & Group 4 −16.1056 0.0000 
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a GCO and statistical information of P(FB) and TD by groups. In the first group, 
the median P(FB) for the firms with and without GCO is 0.95 (p-value of the 
median test is 0.9391) referring to a very high financial distress in both classes. 
The median value of TD for the firms without GCO is 293.5 days and for the 
firms with GCO 304.6 days (p-value 0.6523) referring to a long time distance. In 
this group, the percentage of the firms received GCO is 71.01% that clearly ex-
ceeds the average of the whole sample (54.57%). Thus, the percentage is mod-
erate supporting H1a. In the second group, the medians of P(FB) are also 0.95 
(p-value 0.6372) whereas the medians of TD are significantly lower, being 137.8 
days for the firms without GCO and 121.8 days for the firms with GCO (p-value 
0.5685). For this group, the percentage of the firms received GCO is as high as 
81.05%. Thus, for the group with a high P(FB) but a short TD the percentage or 
the accuracy of GCO is high which gives support to H1b. Panel 2 of Table 1 
shows that the difference in the percentage between the groups 1 and 2 is statis-
tically significant.  
In the third group, the median of P(FB) is 0.55 for the firms without GCO and 
0.70 for the firms with GCO (p-value 0.0003) emphasizing the effect of P(FB) in 
this group. The median values however clearly exceed the cut-off value of P(FB) 
(0.50) giving thus a signal of serious distress. Similarly, the medians of TD differ 
from each other between the classes (p-value 0.1074) being 345.6 days for the 
firms without GCO and 307.2 days for those with GCO. For this group of a not 
high P(FB) and a long TD the percentage of the firms with GCO is very low 
(24.21%) indicating a very low accuracy of GCO and clearly supporting H1c. 
This percentage differs statistically very significantly from those of groups 1 and 
2 (Panel 2). In the fourth group, the medians of P(FB) similarly differ by the 
classes (p-value 0.0001) so that it is 0.72 for the firms with GCO and much lower 
for those without GCO only 0.61. However, the medians of TD do not differ sig-
nificantly between the classes being 122.9 days for the firms without GCO and 
115.3 days for those with GCO (p-value 0.7059). The percentage of the firms re-
ceived GCO is clearly higher than the percentage in group 3 but lower than in 
groups 1 and 2 (Panel 2). Thus, the percentage of the accuracy of GCO is low 
being lower than the median of the whole sample supporting H1d.   
4.2. Hypotheses H2a-H2d 
Table 2 presents the median values for the auditor variables by GCO classes and 
groups (for the binary variables means are displayed). In group 1 (high P(FB) 
and long TD), the medians of the compliance measures for analysis part 1 and 2 
are clearly higher in firms which received a GCO (84.6 & 84.5) than in the firms 
that did not receive it (65.3 & 77.47). Although the statistical significance is not 
very high for the differences in the variables (p-values 0.066 & 0.104), empirical 
evidence clearly supports H2a assuming that analytic auditors perform better 
than intuitive auditors do in GCO accuracy. There are also other significant dif-
ferences in the auditor variables between the GCO classes. The auditors issuing a  
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Auditor gender* 0.80 0.80 0.4849 0.83 0.83 0.4912 0.81 0.87 0.2440 0.85 0.80 0.3093 
Auditor quality grade 2.25 3.00 0.1642 3.00 2.00 0.0660 2.00 2.00 0.2511 2.00 2.00 0.3543 
Auditor tier* 0.10 0.16 0.2507 0.39 0.27 0.1665 0.29 0.43 0.1025 0.38 0.23 0.0923 
Legal entity* 0.20 0.18 0.4379 0.11 0.14 0.3628 0.14 0.22 0.1856 0.21 0.13 0.2194 
Working type* 0.65 0.61 0.3853 0.67 0.57 0.2310 0.56 0.70 0.1185 0.54 0.77 0.0261 
Number of engagements annually 179.5 145.0 0.2702 212.0 130.0 0.1376 118.0 150.0 0.3836 108.0 150.0 0.2786 
Number of hours on engagements 754.0 800.0 0.3262 1003.0 642.0 0.1376 804.0 760.0 0.3066 465.0 805.0 0.0604 
Number of hours per engagement 3.25 3.80 0.3262 3.70 3.60 0.4801 3.45 3.60 0.3824 3.40 4.40 0.0059 
Auditor age 62.00 61.00 0.3386 60.00 59.00 0.4092 60.00 58.00 0.2483 60.00 58.00 0.2249 
Years after auditor exam 25.00 23.00 0.1859 21.50 21.00 0.4332 25.00 24.00 0.4272 24.00 24.00 0.4442 
Taxable salary (annual) 28,517 58,011 0.0663 40,137 48,882 0.0651 45,238 52,948 0.1058 51,555 44,303 0.1903 
Capital gain (annual) 2248 2071 0.4696 0 2476 0.0651 1591 1782 0.4447 612 541 0.3529 
Total salary (annual) 41,806 66,610 0.0663 42,051 55,000 0.0651 46,832 62,770 0.0422 53,603 52,820 0.4583 
Number of hours on audit courses 24.50 10.00 0.1292 6.50 0.00 0.4803 0.00 7.00 0.0548 14.00 0.00 0.3529 
Compliance: planning 91.45 91.61 0.4774 88.28 90.91 0.1605 88.89 85.16 0.2519 68.75 88.31 0.2786 
Compliance: analytical procedure 1 65.32 84.62 0.0663 81.25 72.73 0.1376 78.28 60.27 0.2556 75.00 72.92 0.4583 
Compliance: analytical procedure 2 77.47 84.52 0.1040 83.73 73.66 0.0108 77.32 77.78 0.3836 77.32 78.93 0.3608 
Compliance: conclusions 91.57 95.83 0.0211 91.90 91.30 0.2822 91.51 88.64 0.4283 91.30 93.19 0.1425 
Legend: * = Mean instead of median displayed; # = For the scales of variables see Appendix 1; § = 1-tailed Chi-Square median test. 
 
GCO have a higher degree in compliance with conclusions standards and they 
get higher income than the auditors not issuing a GCO do get. 
In group 2 (high P(FB) and short TD) the relationships between the intui-
tive-analytic dimension and the GC prediction accuracy are opposite. The me-
dians of the analysis compliance measures are significantly lower in the class of 
issuing a GCO (72.7 & 73.7) than in that of not issuing a GCO (81.3 & 83.7). 
Thus, empirical evidence for group 2 supports hypothesis H2b assuming that in 
this situation intuitive auditors perform better than analytic auditors do. More-
over, the auditors issuing a GCO, usually have got a lower grade in the peer re-
view assessment and higher income than the auditors not issuing a GCO. Thus, 
in both groups 1 and 2 the auditors, who have given a GCO to bankrupt firms, 
tend to have a higher income level irrespective of the cognitive style. 
In group 3 (low P(FB) and long TD) where the GCO accuracy is lowest, the 
compliance measures of analysis parts 1 and 2 do not in a statistically significant 
way differ between the GCO classes. This finding supports hypothesis H2c that 
assumes that the cognition style does not affect GCO prediction accuracy. How-
ever, the median for the compliance of analytical part 1 is very low (60.3) for the 
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auditors issuing a GCO compared with median in another class (78.3). The rela-
tionship is anyway so unsystematic that the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant (p-value 0.256). The auditors issuing a GCO have also in this group a high-
er income than the auditors in the other class do. Moreover, they are more often 
Tier 1 (KHT) auditors working full-time. 
In group 4 (low P(FB) and short TD) where the GCO accuracy is low, the dif-
ferences in the medians of the analysis compliance measures are not statistically 
significant. This result obviously supports hypothesis H2d that assumes that 
both cognition styles perform equally in this situation. For the auditors not is-
suing a GCO the median of the compliance measure for part planning is excep-
tionally low (68.8) as compared with the median in the other class (88.3). How-
ever, the relationship is unsystematic and thus not statistically significant. In this 
group, the relationship between the auditors’ income and the class of GCO is not 
significant as it is in other groups. However, the auditors issuing a GCO in this 
group are more often lower tier (HTM) and full-time working auditors who 
spend more time annually on engagements in general and more hours per en-
gagement than their counterparts who do not issue a GCO in this situation. 
5. Conclusions 
The GC judgment is an important audit issue that has been intensively investi-
gated from several points of view. In this study, the focus was set on two related 
questions about the accuracy of the GC judgment in considering a failing client 
that will bankrupt. Thus, this study concentrates on the classification Type I er-
ror and its determinants. Firstly, it was hypothesized that a good explanation for 
the variation in the accuracy can be drawn from the situation of the client before 
bankruptcy. It was assumed that there are two main variables that determine the 
characteristics of the situation in terms of GC prediction accuracy. These va-
riables were the estimated financial risk and the time distance to bankruptcy. 
The dimensions anchored by not high—high financial risk and by short—long 
time distance made it possible to classify clients into four different groups. It was 
expected that the group of clients with high financial risk and short time dis-
tance is most accurate to judge right in GC. However, it was also expected that 
the group of clients with not high financial risk and long time distance to bank-
ruptcy is least accurate to do so. The rest combinations of the dimensions were 
less accurate to judge than the former group but more accurate to judge than the 
latter group. 
The hypotheses were assessed by empirical data from 328 Finnish small 
bankrupt firms. Empirical evidence supported the research hypotheses. The dif-
ferences in the prediction accuracy between the groups describing the GC situa-
tion before bankruptcy were statistically very significant. In the group with high 
financial risk and short time distance to bankruptcy the percentage of the firms 
received a GCO was 81.1% whereas in the group with not high financial risk and 
long time distance it was only 24.2%. On average, the prediction accuracy of is-
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suing GCO was 54.6% that corresponds to the percentages often got in previous 
studies [2] [3]. Thus, the results indicate that the variation in the prediction ac-
curacy of GC judgment found in prior studies can be a result of a variation in the 
financial risk and time distance to bankruptcy in the sample of failing clients. 
Secondly, it was hypothesized that the accuracy of GC judgment is also related 
to the fit between the situation of the client before bankruptcy and the cognitive 
style of the auditor. If there is a misfit, the performance in predicting is assumed 
to impair [9] [10]. It was assumed that in the situation with high financial risk 
and long time distance analytic auditors perform better than intuitive auditors 
do due to the structured nature of information. However, it was hypothesized 
that in the situation with high financial risk and long time distance intuitive au-
ditors perform better than analytic ones because of the accumulation of un-
structured non-financial information. Other groups were considered as unde-
sirable for both cognitive types. 
These hypotheses were tested by the aforementioned data. There were in all 
172 auditors who had acted as the last auditors in the data from 328 failing client 
firms. Empirical evidence supported the hypotheses showing that the fit between 
the client situation (task) and the cognitive style was an important factor affect-
ing the GCO issuing accuracy. These findings implicate that to financially 
high-risk clients it would be useful to estimate the time distance to the potential 
bankruptcy. This distance is related to the nature of information that the auditor 
is receiving for GC judgment. If there is a plenty of non-financial unstructured 
information, an intuitive auditor seems to perform better than an analytic one. 
However, if the information mainly consists of structured financial information, 
an analytic auditor can perform well. In situation where the financial risk of the 
client is not high, the cognitive style does not play an important role. In addi-
tion, the variation in issuing accuracy of GCO in prior studies may be related to 
the variation in the cognitive styles of the auditors in the sample. 
The analysis of the auditor variables gave interesting additional findings. In 
three groups, the income of the auditor was usually higher for those auditors 
who issued a GCO to the bankrupt client. This finding can refer to the effect 
created by economic independence from the client [3]. It indicates that income 
is related to audit quality as defined as the accuracy of GC judgment, client situ-
ation, and auditors’ cognitive style judgment. The group with not high financial 
risk and short time distance was the only group where this income effect was not 
identified. However, in this group the tier of the auditor, full-time working, and 
spending more time on engagement in general and in special more hours per 
engagement were related to better performance.  
In summary, this study contributes to the auditing research being the first ap-
proach that systematically investigates the relationship between financial risk, 
distance to bankruptcy, and cognitive style on GC judgment in an archival re-
search. It contributes to the research when showing that an auditor’s accuracy in 
issuing a GCO largely depends on estimated financial risk of the client, time to 
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bankruptcy, and the fit between her or his cognitive style and the characteristics 
of the issuing situation. Thus, this research has produced new and interesting 
findings about the accuracy of GC judgment. However, it is also subject to some 
limitations that should be solved in future research. Firstly, the study sample 
consisted of very small firms that can have peculiar characteristics that differ 
them from larger firms. In future studies, larger firms should be studied as well. 
Secondly, the present sample only included bankrupt firms to focus on the clas-
sification Error Type 1. In future, also acting (Going concern) firms should be 
investigated. Thirdly, the auditors in the sample do not audit public companies, 
which excluded Big 4 auditors from the study. Therefore, in further studies, 
these auditors should also be studied.  
Fourthly, in this study only a rough classification with respect to financial risk 
and time distance to bankruptcy has been applied resulting in only four groups. 
In further studies, it would be fruitful to use a larger sample and more sophisti-
cated classification. Fifthly, the dimension anchored by intuitive-analytic is 
measured by the auditor’s compliance with ISA standards on the analytic pro-
cedures in peer review. In future, personality tests could also be used to measure 
this dimension. Finally, further studies could apply more advanced statistical 
methods than used here, to show the relationship between GC prediction accu-
racy, client situation, and auditors’ cognitive style.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Medians of the Target Bankrupt Client Variables  
(Last Financial Statements) 
 






















Net sales (Teur) 368.00 313.90 0.1273 465.00 480.35 0.5000 575.00 652.00 0.3804 526.00 773.50 0.3139 
Total assets (Teur) 82.20 139.00 0.0663 152.00 160.50 0.3010 174.35 340.60 0.0422 219.20 392.50 0.0604 
Growth of net sales (%) −9.80 −14.90 0.0626 −3.90 −12.10 0.0886 3.10 −4.55 0.2967 0.70 3.30 0.4564 
Number of employees 5.00 5.00 0.4527 5.00 6.00 0.2743 5.00 7.00 0.3717 6.50 9.00 0.1627 
Net sales per employee (Teur) 57.70 76.00 0.3752 100.75 76.00 0.2520 95.50 99.25 0.4743 100.85 89.90 0.2242 
Gross profit (Teur) 204.65 124.50 0.1453 213.00 245.50 0.1485 278.50 379.00 0.1654 241.50 441.60 0.1661 
Growth of gross profit (%) −1.00 −18.10 0.1092 −14.05 −8.70 0.5000 4.35 7.90 0.5000 0.30 5.80 0.3561 
Gross profit per employee (Teur) 33.90 37.65 0.4184 40.85 46.55 0.2734 51.85 61.60 0.1969 50.40 56.60 0.0589 
EBITDA per net sales (%) −8.60 −10.30 0.2712 −9.20 −12.50 0.2834 3.90 1.00 0.0294 2.90 0.65 0.1932 
EBIT per net sales (%) −14.85 −13.20 0.3260 −11.85 −14.00 0.0529 2.70 −1.15 0.0087 0.00 −3.25 0.0879 
Traditional cash flow per net sales (%) −12.10 −11.74 0.5000 −12.79 −13.72 0.1479 1.68 −2.10 0.0409 1.07 −2.33 0.0831 
Quick ratio 0.30 0.20 0.1453 0.50 0.30 0.0085 0.70 0.30 0.0482 0.80 0.55 0.1581 
Current ratio 0.45 0.40 0.1954 0.70 0.40 0.0206 1.00 0.90 0.0548 1.00 0.90 0.1101 
Return on investment ratio (%) −25.45 −38.90 0.2732 −22.00 −34.50 0.2843 7.20 −8.20 0.0052 0.00 −3.65 0.0898 
Return on assets (%) −22.10 −21.70 0.4696 −16.10 −24.20 0.1376 5.05 −7.50 0.0052 0.00 −3.00 0.0898 
Equity ratio (%) −89.75 −85.40 0.4696 −84.50 −82.40 0.3186 12.20 −7.20 0.0000 9.00 −8.05 0.0000 
Net gearing −1.60 −1.30 0.0211 −1.35 −1.30 0.2773 1.20 −4.30 0.0094 2.50 −4.40 0.0002 
Debt to net sales ratio (%) 65.40 73.25 0.2975 79.45 54.90 0.0584 30.90 42.00 0.0958 39.40 63.75 0.0550 
Working capital (%) 1.65 −0.05 0.1438 −0.45 −1.10 0.5000 8.25 5.20 0.2435 5.40 7.90 0.0550 
Inventories per net sales (%) 7.40 5.15 0.3274 3.30 7.15 0.4111 11.40 10.20 0.3817 7.50 20.60 0.1241 
Collection period of receivables (days) 11.50 16.00 0.3175 21.00 18.00 0.2439 29.00 23.50 0.1682 21.00 36.00 0.1234 
Payment period of payables (days) 44.00 124.00 0.1394 81.50 115.50 0.1446 54.00 71.50 0.1609 56.00 84.00 0.0606 
Legend: § = 1-tailed Chi-Square median test. 
Appendix 2. The Auditor Variables of the Empirical Study 
1) Auditor gender (0 = female & 1 = male) 
2) Auditor quality grade (1 (failed) - 4 (no deficiencies in audit work))  
3) Auditor tier (0 = HT (second tier) & 1 = KHT (first tier)) 
4) Legal entity (0 = private auditor & 1 = auditor in an audit firm) 
5) Working type (0 = part-time & 1 = full-time auditor) 
6) Number of engagements annually  
7) Number of hours on engagements 
8) Number of hours per engagement 
9) Auditor age (in years) 
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10) Years after auditor exam (experience) 
11) Taxable salary (annual, Euro) 
12) Capital gain (annual, Euro) 
13) Total salary (annual, Euro) 
14) Number of hours on audit courses (last year, hours) 
15) Compliance with standards: planning (0% - 100%)  
16) Compliance with standards: analytical procedure 1 (0% - 100%) 
17) Compliance with standards: analytical procedure 2 (0% - 100%) 
18) Compliance with standards: conclusions (0% - 100%) 
 
